Abstract. The provability logic of a theory T is the set of modal formulas, which under any arithmetical realization are provable in T . We slightly modify this notion by requiring the arithmetical realizations to come from a specified set Γ. We make an analogous modification for interpretability logics.
Introduction
In a recent discussion on a mailing list on the foundations of mathematics 1 Joe Shipman asked for important theorems that have essentially only one proof. In reply, Giovanni Sambin provided the example of Solovay's arithmetical completeness theorem of the provability logic GL ( [32] ). This paper deals with restricted cases of Solovay's theorem where alternative proof-methods are available. One of the broad motivations for this paper is the hope of obtaining an alternative proof of Solovay's Theorem (see Section 7) . However, the method of provability logics with restricted realizations, we feel, merits interest in its own right, as we shall explain shortly. Let us first briefly restate Solovay's Completeness Theorem, which is the cornerstone result in the study of provability logics.
1.1. Provability Logics. The propositional modal logic GL, known as Gödel-Löb Logic, captures exactly the behavior of the standard provability predicate in arithmetic. For a given theory T (e.g. Peano Arithmetic), formulas PA are interpreted as, "A is provable in T ". It is defined by extending the basic modal logic K with a schematic formalization of Löb's Theorem (L in the following definition).
arithmetical sentences with a clear arithmetical content, what modal logics results from restricting realizations to this particular set? These questions motivate the following definition. We shall write, par abus de langage, * ∈ Γ to mean that the realization * takes on all its values within the set of sentences Γ. Clearly, by taking Γ to be the set of all arithmetical sentences 4 we get PL ∆ (T ) = PL(T ). Thus, the simple Lemma 1.4 can be used to establish upperbounds for a provability logic if one is unable to find the full provability logic. For example, it is a long standing open question what the provability logic is of bounded arithmetics such as S 1 2 . 5 1.3. Applications and plan of the paper. One can thus use Γ to study the provability logic of T . On the other hand, we shall see that PL Γ (T ) can also be used to characterize the fragment Γ. For example, in Theorem 2.1 below we consider the closed fragment B of provability logic, which consists of boolean combinations of iterated (in)consistency statements. This fragment is given by the following grammar.
B := ⊥ | B → B | PB. We shall see that the modal formulas valid under all realizations from this fragment are exactly the formulas valid on all finite strict linear orders. This can be said to provide yet further evidence that reflection principles and iterated consistency statements are inherently linearly ordered.
Moreover, this fact also gives us information on what kind of arithmetical fixed point constructions are needed in the proof of Theorem 1.2. By the modal Fixed Point Theorem, independently due to de Jongh and Sambin (see [29] (de Jongh actually never published his proof)), we know that certain applications of the arithmetical fixed point theorem can be dispensed with. More precisely, if we have a formula A(x) where the x only occurs directly under the scope of a Bew T predicate then applying the fixed point to this formula does not give us new expressive power. That is, if we can prove B ↔ A( B ) then B is actually provably equivalent to a formula in the language of provability logic. Thus, these sort of applications of the arithmetical fixed point theorem only yield formulas in B, whence, pace Theorem 3.2, cannot suffice for a proof of Solovay's completeness result, Theorem 1.2.
Another example of restricting the substitutions is known in the literature. In [34] Visser studied the provability logic that arises when restricting substitutions to Σ 1 sentences.
In Section 4 we shall consider a fragment D which contains infinitely many copies of B for increasingly strong provability predicates. It turns out that even for this richer fragment we do not move beyond linear frames (cf. Theorem 4.5). However, 4 By inspection of Solovay's proof we actually see that PL Σ 2 (T ) = PL(T ). This is so as all the limit statements λy can be taken to be Σ 2 and we stay within that class taking disjunctions. 5 This question has been studied in depth in [7] . The question also has important connections to matters in computational complexity. For example, it is shown in [11] that if S 1 2 proves Π b 1 -completeness with parameters (Π b 1 is the set of formulas (∀x ≤ t) θ with θ sharply bounded), then NP = coNP.
in Section 5 we shall see that there is a natural fragment for PRA whose associated provability logic lies strictly in between the logic of linear frames and GL.
In Section 8 we shall see how restricted realizations can also be applied to interpretability logics.
Fragments and Logics
In this section we show that certain conditions on a given fragment translate to a semantic characterization of the corresponding restricted provability logics. First, some preliminaries on basic relational semantics for provability logics.
Recall that a frame F for GL is an ordered pair W, R , where W is a set of points and R ⊆ W × W is a finite, irreflexive, and transitive relation. Given a set Prop of propositional variables, a model M based on F is a triple W, R, V , where V : Prop → ℘(W ) is a valuation function assigning to each variable the set of the points where it is true. We shall also write V for the straightforward extension of V to arbitrary modal formulas. We then write W, R, V , w A, just in case w ∈ V (A). We write W, R, V A if A ∈ V (w) for all w ∈ W . Overloading notation, we also write W, R A, if W, R, V A for all V . We say A is valid in the model and in the frame, respectively.
When dealing with fragments, however, arbitrary variables will not be present. All of the fragments we shall consider in this paper will extend the fragment B defined above, by adding constants σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , ..., with some clear arithmetical content. As these constants will be fixed, and as we would like to characterize the sentences in this fragment modally, we shall add constants s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , ..., to our modal language, and correspondingly extend the definition of a realization to ensure that (s i ) * = σ i . In fact, given this convention, we will be able to define our fragments in a single language and throughout treat each constant simultaneously as a constant in the modal language and as a specified arithmetical formula, disambiguating whenever the distinction is not clear from context. In other words, we will usually not distinguish between A and A * . On the other hand, as far as the relational semantics is concerned, the constants s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , ... are simply treated as variables. Therefore the above notation is extended in the obvious way to this setting.
Suppose we would like to obtain a modal characterization of PL F (T ). Under certain circumstances, it suffices to know how F is characterized according to T . To be precise, if we have a model M based on a frame F, such that for each A ∈ F, the following condition holds:
Here, L(F) is the set of formulas in the basic modal language (with propositional variables) valid on the frame F. There are two side conditions to our theorem. One of them involves imagefiniteness. We call a model image-finite if {y : xRy} is finite for each x. We shall denote the set {y : xRy} ∪ {x} by x ↑. Our theorem thus reads as follows: 
Proof. In the light of (1) it suffices to prove that
⇐ Consider some arbitrary * ∈ F and define V * (p) := {i : M, i p * }. By induction on A we see that for each i ∈ F
and we are done. ⇒ Given some i ∈ F and some arbitrary valuation V we define * by
As the frame is image-finite, the disjunction is finite. By an induction 6 on C we see again that
As i was arbitrary, we see that F C.
As we shall see below, in many occasions we actually will have something stronger than (1). In particular we shall often find ourselves in a situation where we have, apart from the frame, also a modal logic L for which we have
This logic L will facilitate our calculations considerably.
The Closed Fragment
With Theorem 2.1 we can calculate our first provability logic with restricted substitutions. Recall the definition of the closed fragment B in Subsection 1.3. Definition 3.1. GL.3 is the logic GL together with the linearity axiom:
Here and below, P + A is short for A ∧ PA. Proof. It is well known that the truth of a closed formula at a particular point in a model depends solely on the rank of that point. Here, the rank of a point x is defined as the supremum of lengths of paths leading from x to a leaf. See for example Chapter 7 from [10] . Thus, the linear frame ω, > is universal for B in the sense that if a formula ϕ ∈ B is false at some point in some frame, then it is actually false at some point in ω, > . Thus, by Theorem 1.2, we have T ⊢ A ⇔ ω, > A. 6 In order to get the inductive step for the 2 operator going we should prove the slightly stronger statement that for all j ∈ i ↑ we have F, V , j C ⇔ M, j C * . 7 See Footnote 2 on conditions on theories. The current proof of this theorem invokes Solovay's completeness result, Theorem 1.2, in full. However, in [22] it is shown how we can substitute the use of Solovay's completeness result by the proof of Theorem 2.1. Thus, Theorem 3.2 actually holds for a larger class of theories including I∆ 0 + Ω 1 .
Furthermore, it is known that the logic of the frame ω, > is axiomatized by GL.3. (See, for example, Chapter 13 of [10] .) Thus, ω, > A ⇔ GL.3 ⊢ A and Condition 1 is satisfied for any model based on ω, > .
Note that ω, > is image-finite and that the point n is defined by Q n ⊤ ∧P n+1 ⊥. Thus, by Theorem 2.1 we have our result.
Substitutions from the Closed Fragment of GLP
Japaridze's Logic GLP ( [19] ) describes all of the universally valid schemata for reflection principles of restricted logical complexity in arithmetic. It is formulated in a language with infinitely many modalities, where [n]A is read arithmetically as,
A is provable from T along with all true Π n sentences.
Arithmetical completeness with respect to this interpretation was proven in [18] , for sound theories containing only a modest amount of arithmetic.
Definition 4.1. GLP is given by the following axiom schemata,
(i) All boolean tautologies; (ii) [n]([n]A → A) → [n]A, for all n; (iii) [m]A → [n]A, for m ≤ n; (iii) m A → [n] m A, for m < n; in
addition to the rules of modus ponens and necessitation for each [n].
While GLP does not admit of any frame semantics, various other models have been given (see, e.g. [3] and [4] ). In particular, Ignatiev [18] has defined a universal frame for the closed fragment of GLP, denoted GLP 0 , which will be of use.
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Define D to be the fragment given by the following infinite grammar:
That is, GLP 0 is simply GLP restricted to the fragment D, with no variables.
We can describe Ignatiev's universal frame for GLP 0 as follows. Let Ω consist of the set of ω-sequences of ordinals (α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , ...), where each α i < ǫ 0 . Recall ǫ 0 is the least fixed point of the equation ω α = α. If the Cantor Normal Form of α is ω λn + ... + ω λ1 , then let e(α) := λ 1 and set e(0) = 0.
Definition 4.2. Ignatiev's universal frame is defined as
Notice that each point in U can be seen as a finite, strictly decreasing sequence of ordinals less than ǫ 0 , as each sequence ends in an infinite tail of zeros. For a visualization of the frame, see Figure 1 .
A point of the form (α, e(α), e(e(α)), ...), where α i+1 = e(α i ) for all i, is called a root point, and is denoted by α when α is the first coordinate. Thus every coordinate of α is uniquely determined by α. The following lemma is then obvious, given the definition of U. In addition to the more routine soundness, the following strong completeness theorem has also been proven using several different methods in the works cited above.
With these results we can now show that even with this much richer fragment the resulting provability logic is exactly the same as for the fragment with only the single P-operator (c.f. Theorem 3.2).
Proof. By Theorem 3.2, by Lemma 1.4 and by observing that P is just [0], it is clear that PL D (PRA) ⊆ GL.3. For the other inclusion, we must show, under the arithmetical interpretation,
for any A, B ∈ D. However, this follows by arithmetical completeness and by the universality of Ignatiev's frame. For, suppose U, α Q(PA ∧ ¬B) ∧ Q(P + B ∧ ¬A), for some α. By Theorem 4.4 there are root points β and γ, such that U, β PA ∧ ¬B, and U, γ P + B ∧ ¬A. By Lemma 4.3, either βR 0 γ, γR 0 β, or β = γ. All three lead to contradiction.
Non-Linear GL-frames
Theorems 3.2 and 4.5 suggest that it may not be straightforward to define a fragment whose associated restricted provability logic is anything other than GL.3 or just GL. In this section we fill in this gap by giving some sufficient conditions on constants, so that we obtain logics of non-linear GL-frames. We will be working with generic fragments F n , with some finite number n of constants:
As before, we will be viewing formulas in F n simultaneously as arithmetical formulas, where each s i is a specified formula in the language of arithmetic and P is the standard provability predicate, and as modal formulas, where each s i is interpreted as a constant and P is a normal modal operator. 5.1. Fragments, Logics and Models. Let s i stand for the sentence j∈J s j+1 ∧ k∈K ¬s k+1 , where J is the set of places in the binary expansion for i with value 1, and K is the complement of J in {0, . . . , i − 1}. Then we define the following class of logics.
Definition 5.1. The logic FGL n is formulated in the language F n and thus, contains no propositional variables. The axioms and rules are specified by the axioms and rules of GL together with the list of the 2 n many axioms below, one axiom for each Boolean combination of the s i . The B in these axioms stands for any formula that is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form P α ⊥, where α < ω + 1 and
. . . These logics FGL n come with an associated model, based on the following frames:
n }, and m, i R n p, j just in case p < m.
The associated model defined on this frame is given via the binary expansion, where J j is given as above, relative to j. Proof Sketch. The full proof for the case of F 1 is established in [23] . Here we give a sketch for the general case. Soundness is routine. For completeness, we use the following two lemmata.
These lemmata are straightforwardly proven by manipulation of modal normal forms. Completeness is then clear. If FGL n A, then by Lemma 5.6, FGL n PA, and by Lemma 5.5, FGL n ⊢ PA ↔ P α ⊥, for some α < ω (in particular α = ω). By soundness, for any point m, i ∈ G n we know G
PA. That, in turn, means for some β, j with β < α, we have G
5.2.
Conditions for completeness. Suppose we have a given theory T and some fragment F n , and we would like a characterization of PL Fn (T ). In Section 2 we showed that if condition (1) holds for some logic L and model M, then Theorem 2.1 will follow. Recall Condition (1):
To show (1) holds for this case, one merely needs to show arithmetical soundness and completeness of L for T . However, given Lemmata 5.5 and 5.6, arithmetical completeness of L depends only on arithmetical soundness of L. To see this, suppose FGL n A. Then by Lemma 5.5, FGL n PA. Since FGL n PA ↔ P α ⊥, for α = ω, as long as we have soundness of L, T ⊢ PA ↔ P α ⊥, under the arithmetical interpretation. Now, if moreover T is a sound theory in the sense that it does not prove any false statements we get T PA, from which it follows T A.
Consequently, the following is a corollary of Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 5.4. Note that both image finiteness and definability of the states in the model G
• n are evident.
In Section 6, we shall see that each of these frames G n has a simple axiomatization. For the rest of this section, we exhibit a suitable constant for the case of F 1 .
5.3.
A Constant for IΣ 1 . Recall IΣ 1 is the theory Q ([33]) along with induction over Σ 1 formulas. This theory is finitely axiomatizable, so let σ stand for the sentence axiomatizing it. We then define the fragment Q as a special case of F 1 :
Our theory T will be Primitive Recursive Arithmetic (PRA), essentially just Q with function symbols for all of the primitive recursive functions and induction over ∆ 0 formulas. The relationship between IΣ 1 and PRA is well studied and understood ( [27] , [28] , [1] ). By Corollary 5.7, we need to show that FGL n is sound with respect to PRA. It is already well known that PL(PRA) = GL, so certainly all the axioms and rules of GL are sound. We need only observe the following also hold:
consequence of what is known as Parson's Theorem (named after Charles Parsons, but discovered independently by Grigori Mints and Gaisi Takeuti), which says that IΣ 1 is Π 2 -conservative over PRA. In [1] it is shown that this theorem is in fact formalizable in PRA, which gives us (i).
So this certainly holds for B(Σ 1 ) formulas consisting of Boolean combinations of formulas of the form P α ⊥. As for (ii), it is shown in [23] that the negation of the sentence axiomatizing IΣ 1 is Π 3 -conservative over PRA. That is, we have the following lemma:
Thus, we can state the following corollary:
While the logic GL.3 of the linear frame G 0 is well known, that of G 1 is not. Therefore in the following section we provide a simple axiomatization. Our work can then be generalized to arbitrary G n .
6. The Logic of G 1 6.1. The Modal Logic GL.4 and its corresponding class of frames. We define GL.4 to be the normal modal logic obtained by adding to GL the following two axiom schemata:
GL.4 in fact defines a natural class of frames. We define C to be the class satisfying the following properties:
C1. Finite, irreflexive and transitive; C2. Non-triple branching:
Theorem 6.1. GL.4 is sound and complete with respect to C.
Soundness is proven as usual by induction on complexity of proofs. As for completeness, we shall appeal to the canonical model of GL.4 (see Definition 4.18 of [9] ). In particular we use the finite filtration method to transform the canonical model into a model in the class C. In fact, these follow by the fact that axiom Q1 is canonical for property C2, as is axiom Q2 for C3 (see [9] , Definition 4.31). Thus, it remains to show that we can transform the underlying frame of M into a finite partial order, while preserving validity of formulas.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Suppose that GL.4 A, for some formula A. We would like to find a maximal consistent set Γ such that (PA ∧ ¬A) ∈ Γ, so that Γ is an 'irreflexive' point in the canonical model.
By the fact that A is not a theorem, we are guaranteed of some ∆ ∈ W
GL.4
such that A / ∈ ∆. If PA ∈ ∆, then set Γ := ∆. Otherwise, since ¬PA ∈ ∆, by the contrapositive form of Löb's Theorem Q(PA ∧ ¬A) ∈ ∆. Thus by the so-called 'Existence Lemma' ( [9] , Lemma 4.20) for normal modal logics, ∆ is R GL.4 -related to some Σ for which (PA ∧ ¬A) ∈ Σ. In that case, set Γ := Σ.
Either way we have some Γ with (PA ∧ ¬A) ∈ Γ. Notice also, if PC is a subformula of A, and PC / ∈ Γ, then by the same argument there is some 'irreflexive' ∆ such that ΓR GL.4 ∆ and that (PC ∧ ¬C) ∈ ∆. Moreover, by Lemma 6.2 there are at most two distinct such ∆.
With these observations in place, our filtrated model M ′ = W, R, V will be defined as a submodel of M:
(i) W := {Γ} ∪ {∆ : ΓR GL.4 ∆, and there is PC subsentence of A, such that (PC ∧ ¬C) ∈ ∆ and ¬PC ∈ Γ}; (ii) R is just R GL.4 restricted to points in W ;
The model M ′ satisfies C2, C3, and transitivity simply because M does. It is clearly finite. And irreflexivity, as hinted above, follows from the fact that each point in W was chosen to contain some formulas PC and ¬C, ensuring the point is not related to itself. It follows M ′ is in C. The standard 'Truth Lemma' is then proven by induction:
Concluding the proof, since A / ∈ Γ, we have that M ′ , Γ A.
6.2.
The Class C and the Frame G 1 . We must now show that GL.4 is the logic of the frame
′ f (y); and if f (x)R ′ y ′ then there is some y ∈ W such that f (y) = y ′ and xRy. The following theorem is standard: To demonstrate that GL.4 is the logic of G 1 , we use the following proposition: Proposition 6.6. For any frame F ∈ C and any point x in F, there is some point m, i in G 1 , such that there exists a p-morphism from the subframe generated by m, i to the subframe generated by x.
In other words, falsifiability is reflected by p-morphisms, which gives us the following corollary of Proposition 6.6 and improvement upon Corollary 5.10. 
It remains only to verify Proposition 6.6.
Proof Sketch of Proposition 6.6. The proof proceeds by induction on the number of points in a frame in C. The basic case is obvious. Supposing we have a frame with one point, say x, then consider the subframe generated by 0, 0 , and the p-morphism mapping 0, 0 to x.
Supposing we have a frame in C with n + 1 points, consider the subframe F = W, R generated by some point x ∈ C. We would like to use the inductive hypothesis to obtain a p-morphism to some subframe of F containing ≤ n points, and extend it to all of F. To do this we consider three cases: (i) x has no successors; (ii) x has one immediate successor (i.e. point y such that xRy and there is no z with xRzRy); and (iii) x has two immediate successors. More than 2 immediate successors is ruled out by property C2.
Case (i) is trivial. For case (ii), let F
′ be F without the point x, and let y be the unique immediate successor of x. Then since F ′ ∈ C and it has n points, we have a p-morphism f from the subframe generated by some point m, i in G 1 to F ′ , the subframe generated by y. We then consider the subframe generated by m + 1, i instead, and extend the p-morphism f so that f ( m + 1, i ) = x and f ( m, i − 1 ) = y. Verifying case (iii) is similar, except that instead of removing the point x, we must remove the 'maximal' points of F. Then the p-morphism obtained by inductive hypothesis is extended by shifting each point in the morphism by one. Thus, e.g. if m, i is mapped to y, then in the new mapping m + 1, i is mapped to y. And we let f ( 0, 0 ) = f ( 0, 1 ) = x. The details are straightforward and are left to the reader (or can be found in [17] ).
Remark 6.8. The methods in this section carry over to the general case of frames G n for arbitrary n. By an analogous argument, one can prove the logic is simply Q2 (strong confluence) and the axiom corresponding to "non-n+2-ary-branching", which is just a generalization
10 of non-branching and non-triple-branching:
On the proof of Solovay's Theorem
In Sections 3 and 4 we showed that PL F (T ) = GL.3 for a wide range of arithmetical theories T and fragments F . Otherwise put, PL F (T ) gives us the logic of non-branching GL-frames. Prima facie, one might imagine the possibility of strategically adding sentences into the fragment F (where F is, e.g. B), so as to obtain the logic of non-triple-branching GL-frames, then that of non-quadruplebranching GL-frames, and so on. Assuming this could be generalized it would be possible to define an infinite fragment H, for which PL H (T ) = GL. At that point, to the extent that Solovay's Theorem is not already assumed in the determination of H, we would have a new proof of the result. After all, any non-theorem of GL can be falsified on some finite, and thus finitely branching, frame. So the witnessing realization would make use of some finite subset of the fragment, sufficient to falsify the formula.
What we have shown is that the first step in this process is (almost) possible, vis-à-vis Corollary 5.10. Adding the constant for IΣ 1 and capitalizing on the well studied relationship between that theory and PRA, we are able to obtain the logic of non-triple-branching (and strongly confluent) GL-frames. Two important questions remain, however, before taking the next step.
The first and most obvious question is what the further constants will be. The particular case of IΣ 1 and PRA is already well studied. Going beyond that may require some significant arithmetical investigation. In Section 5.2 we isolated what arithmetical facts are sufficient to hold. So on the proposed strategy it would simply be a matter of finding a theory and a fragment that satisfy these requirements.
The second, and more curious, question is how to dispense with property C3, strong confluence. We have seen that the logic of the frame G n always contains the formula Q2, and so it will clearly remain in the limit. However Q2 is obviously 10 It is not hard to see that
not a theorem of GL. Finding constants whose associated provability logics do not validate Q2 may prove a challenge. Understanding this situation may shed light on Solovay's original proof.
Interpretability Logics with Restricted Substitutions
Interpretations are used throughout mathematics and logic. Loosely speaking, an interpretation from a theory V into a theory U is structure preserving map that translates theorems of V to theorems of U . The notion of interpretability that we discuss below is grosso modo that of [33] and details can be found in, e.g. [20] or in [36] .
8.1. Interpretability Logics. Interpretability can be seen as a generalization of provability. By α £ T β we denote a natural formalized version of the statement that T + β is interpretable in T + α.
Interpretability Logics are designed to capture the structural behavior of formalized interpretability. The language of these logics is that of provability logic together with a binary modality £, orthographically identical to the arithmetical operator, to model formalized interpretability. And indeed, arithmetical realizations are extended as expected by imposing that
For a clear distinction, let Form IL denote the class of modal formulas in language of interpretability logic and Form GL the standard modal language of basic provability logic. In analogy with the definition of PL(T ) we define IL(T ), the interpretability logic of a theory T
IL(T
By Theorem 1.2 and Footnote 2 we see that provability logics are the same for all sufficiently strong theories. This is certainly not the case for interpretability logics, which turn out to be more sensitive to differences between theories. One such example is the notion of an essential reflexive theory. A theory is reflexive if it proves the consistency of any finite subpart of it. A theory is essentially reflexive whenever any finite extension of it is reflexive. The following theorem is due independently to A. Berarducci and V. Shavrukov. The definition of ILM will follow below.
Theorem 8.1 (Berarducci [6] , Shavrukov [30] ). If T is an essentially reflexive theory, then IL(T) = ILM.
However, if a theory is finitely axiomatizable we get a different outcome where, again, ILP is defined below.
Theorem 8.2 (Visser [35]). If T is finitely axiomatizable, then IL(T) = ILP.
A prominent problem in formalized interpretability is to determine the maximal interpretability logic that is contained in any reasonable arithmetical theory. Definition 8.3. The interpretability logic of all reasonable arithmetical theories, written IL(All), is the set of formulas ϕ such that for all T and * , T ⊢ ϕ * . Here we let T range over all reasonable 11 arithmetical theories. 11 The boundaries are not exactly determined and will depend a bit on the answer. It is legitimate to think of any theory extending I∆ 0 + exp.
Clearly, IL(All) is in the intersection of ILM and ILP but apparently it possesses a very rich structure (see [25] , and [12] ). In this paper, it is only important to know that a certain very weak logic to be defined below is part of IL(PRA).
Fact 8.4. ILW ⊂ IL(PRA)
For most theories that do not fall under Theorems 8.1 and 8.2, the interpretability logic is unknown. The theory PRA is a notable example: the logic IL(PRA) is still unknown. The most recent results for IL(PRA) are presented in [8] .
PRA is known to be the same as IΣ R 1 where IΣ R n is defined as I∆ 0 + exp plus the Σ n induction rule. See for example [2] . In that paper a proof can also be found for the following theorem. The logical complexity of interpretability is Σ 3 and in [31] it is shown that it is essentially so. However, by a theorem due to Orey and Hájek we can often reduce the Σ 3 notion of interpretability to the Π 2 notion of Π 1 -conservativity. A theory V is Π 1 -conservative over U , we write U £ Π1 V , whenever for all Π 1 sentences π we have that [V ⊢ π implies U ⊢ π].
Theorem 8.6 (Orey-Hájek). For reflexive theories U and V we have
and this equivalence is provable in EA.
One advantage of this characterization is evidently that the logical complexity of Π 1 -conservativity is lower than that of interpretability. Another advantage is that the so-called Π 1 -conservativity logic is a relatively stable notion. The Π 1 -conservativity logic of a theory T is just the set of modal formulas in Form IL that are provable in T under any arithmetical realization where the £ modality is mapped to £ Π1 . The theorem was first proven by Hájek and Montagna in [13] and [14] Footnote 4) , the substitutions in the completeness proof can be taken 12 to be Σ 2 .
The logics ILM and ILP have elegant syntactical presentations. We shall define them in parts. First, we define a logic IL that is present to all interpretability logics studied. Next this logic IL is extended by adding more axiom schemata.
(When we write formulas in Form IL we adhere to the following binding conventions. We say that £ binds stronger than → but weaker than all other connectives. Using this convention we can save a lot of brackets.) 12 Albert Visser (p.c.) notes that close inspection of the proof actually reveals that the substitutions can be taken to be ∆ 2 (IΠ 
Apart from the axiom schemata enumerated in Definition 8.9 we will need consider other axiom schemata too.
If X is a set of axiom schemata we will denote by ILX the logic that arises by adding the axiom schemata in X to IL. If we moreover know ( * * * ) : ILW.3 ⊢ ϕ ⇒ ∀ * ∈B PRA ⊢ ϕ * we would be done. For then we have by ( * * ) and ( * * * ) that
We first see that ( * * * ) holds. Certainly, by Fact 8.4, we have that ILW ⊆ IL B (PRA). Thus it remains to show that PRA ⊢ P(PA * → B * ) ∨ P(⊡B * → A * ) for any formulas A and B in Form IL and any * ∈B. As any formula in the closed fragment of ILW is equivalent to a formula in the closed fragment of GL (see [15] ), Theorem 3.2 gives us that indeed the linearity axiom holds for the closed fragment of GL.
Our translation will be the identity translation except for £. In that case we define (A £ B) tr := P(A tr → (B tr ∨ QB tr )).
We first see that we have ( * * ). It is sufficient to show that ILW.3 ⊢ p £ q → P(p → (q ∨ Qq)). We reason in ILW.3. An instantiation of the linearity axiom gives us P(P¬q → (¬p ∨ q)) ∨ P((¬p ∨ q) ∧ P(¬p ∨ q) → ¬q). The first disjunct immediately yields P(p → (q ∨ Qq)).
In case of the second disjunct we get by propositional logic P(q → Q(p ∧ ¬q)) and thus also P(q → Qp). Now we assume p £ q. By W we get p £ q ∧ P¬p. Together with P(q → Qp), this gives us p £ ⊥, that is P¬p. Consequently we have P(p → (q ∨ Qq)).
We now prove ( * ). By induction on ILW.3 ⊢ ϕ we see that GL.3 ⊢ ϕ tr . All the specific interpretability axioms turn out to be provable under our translation in GL. The only axioms where the PA → PPA axiom scheme is really used is in J 2 and J 4 . To prove the translation of W we also need L 3 .
If GL.3 ⊢ ϕ tr then certainly ILW.3 ⊢ ϕ tr and by ( * * ), ILW.3 ⊢ ϕ.
We thus see that ILW.3 is an upperbound for IL(PRA). Using the translation from the proof of Theorem 8.11, it is not hard to see that both the principles P and M are provable in ILW.3. This tells us that the upperbound is actually not very informative as we know that IL(PRA) M. By a straight-forward generalization of Lemma 1.4 we see that choosing larger Γ will generally yield a smaller IL Γ (PRA) and thus a sharper upperbound. Subsection 8.4 consists of reflections on just how large the Γ should be as to refute M in IL Γ (PRA). First we shall include some observations on a fragment slightly larger than the closed fragment.
8.3.
The closed fragment with a constant for IΣ 1 . If we consider the proof of Theorem 2.1, we see that it does not make any assumptions on the signature of the modal logic under considerations. In particular, the theorem still holds for interpretability logics. In the theorem below we use this to give a semantic characterization of IL F1 (PRA).
In [24] it is established that for a certain frame, that we will denote here by G • 1 , we have the following equivalence.
For the purpose of this paper it is not material to know what exactly the frame G • 1 looks like and we shall refrain from giving a formal definition. It is only important to know that G • 1 is just G
• 1 with some additional accessibility relations to model the £ modality. This, together with the mere equivalence ( †) suffices to obtain the following theorem.
Image-finiteness and definability of separate points is clear as interpretability logic is an extension of provability logic. Thus, by Theorem 2.1 we obtain the result.
In [24] , also a logic PIL is given such that we actually have
This suggests that the following conjecture should not be too hard to prove. In this conjecture, ILM.4 denotes the logic that arises by joining ILM and GL.4.
The inclusion L( G • 1 ) ⊇ ILM.4 is actually very easy and follows from a direct verification of the validity of the axioms on G • 1 . The other direction is harder but not too interesting as we still have M ∈ IL F1 (PRA).
8.4.
Fragments for refuting M in IL Γ (PRA). In [36] it is shown that IL(PRA) A £ QB → P(A £ QB). It is easy to see that ILM ⊢ A £ QB → P(A £ QB). This implies that M is certainly not derivable in IL(PRA). We can also find explicit realizations that violate M, as the following lemma tells us.
Lemma 8.14. For n ≥ 1, we have that IL(IΣ R n ) M. Proof. We define a realization * such that IΣ R n (p £ q → p ∧ Pr £ q ∧ Pr)
* . It is well-known that IΣ R n IΣ n IΣ R n+1 and that, for every n≥1, IΣ n is finitely axiomatized. Let σ n be the single sentence axiomatizing IΣ n . It is also known that (for n ≥ 1) IL(IΣ n ) = ILP and that ILP p £ q → p ∧ Pr £ q ∧ Pr. Thus, for any n≥1 we can find α n , β n and γ n such that IΣ n α n £ β n → α n ∧ Pγ n £ β n ∧ Pγ n .
Note that
EA ⊢ α n £ IΣn β n ↔ σ n ∧ α n £ IΣ R n σ n ∧ β n and EA ⊢ P IΣn γ n ↔ P IΣ R n (σ n → γ n ). Thus, we have IΣ R n σ n ∧ α n £ σ n ∧ β n → σ n ∧ α n ∧ P(σ n → γ n ) £ σ n ∧ β n ∧ P(σ n → γ n ) and we can take p * = σ n ∧ α n , q * = σ n ∧ β n and r * = σ n → γ n .
We see that the realizations used in the proof of Lemma 8.14 get higher and higher complexities. The complexity is certainly higher than Σ 2 .
By Theorem 1 from [8] (Theorem 12.1.1 from [23] ) we know that for α, β ∈ Σ 2 we have PRA ⊢ (α £ β) → ((α ∧ Pγ) £ (β ∧ Pγ)) for any sentence γ. This translates to IL Σ2 (PRA) ⊢ M and indicates that an arithmetical completeness proof for IL(PRA) can not work with only Σ 2 -realizations.
For IΣ R n , n ≥ 2 we know that IL(IΣ 
Future research
We have seen that adding a constant for IΣ 1 to PRA is sufficient to obtain a nontrivial provability logic. By a Theorem of Leivant it is known that IΣ 1 ≡< 2 > EA ⊤. An interesting fragment to consider next for PRA would be the closed fragment together with the set of constants {(< 1 > EA < 2 > EA ) n ⊤ | n ∈ ω} or variants thereof.
